Image Credit: BGP Stream. Image is the graphical representation of the in-process BGP redirection attack emanating and under the control of the People’s Republic of China on 2018/12/28. — Image Credit: **BGP Stream**. Image is the graphical representation of the in-process **BGP redirection attack** emanating and under the control of the People’s Republic of China on 2018/12/28.

ARTEMIS: Targets BGP Hijacks

January 02, 2019 by Marc Handelman in OpenSource, Information Security, Network Protocols, Network Security, BGP Routing Insecurity, BGP

via Jeff Stone writing at Cyberscoop, comes this fascinating reportage, detailing an open-source based effort targeting BGP hijack exploits monikered ARTEMIS (Automatic and Real-Time Detection and Mitigation System, ARTEMIS - a research effort of the INSPIRE group, FORTH Greece (www.inspire.edu.gr) and the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA), University of California San Diego, USA). Examine, if you will - the ARTEMIS ReadMe on the ARTEMIS group's GitHub site.

And, while your at it, read the projects' paper authored by Pavlos Sermpezis, Vasileios Kotronis, Petros Gigis, Xenofontas Dimitropoulos, Danilo Cicalese, Alistair King, and Alberto Dainotti. Entitled "ARTEMIS: Neutralizing BGP Hijacking within a Minute", it will astound you with the technical chops this team possesses. H/T

Latest Chinese BGP Redirect: Your Bits Are In Beijing

November 14, 2018 by Marc Handelman in BGP Routing Insecurity, Network Insecurity, Information Security, Information Warfare

News, via Ars Technica's Dan Goodin, detailing another BGP SNAFU - with the end result being the re-route of legit traffic - and this time - it's Googles' (Nasdaq: GOOG) bits-in-question. Included in the particularly bad-news-for-the-interwebs, is the belief that this redirect was not malicious - this, of course, remains to be proven. Stay Tuned.

Image Credit, Chris C. Demchak and Yuval Shavitt from their paper: China’s Maxim – Leave No Access Point Unexploited: The Hidden Story of China Telecom’s BGP Hijacking

Of Course It Was Intentional (And Easy-Peazy, Too!)

November 07, 2018 by Marc Handelman in Espionage, BGP Routing Security, BGP Routing Insecurity

via Dan Goodin's, writing (and editing) at Ars Technica, comes his concise prose illustrating the 3rd level of hell that is BGP, plus an intentional espionage-like data gathering operation executing flawlessly for more than a calendar year by the People's Republic of China (PRC) (The evidence is thin, yet highly indicative of some level of foreknowledge (perhaps even Command and Control) by the Communist Chinese regime)). And, then there's this... All In All, Certainly A Caper Worth Concerted Investigation...