Infosecurity.US

Nitrozac and Snaggy: Klout, Emphatic

via the comic genius of Nitrozac and Snaggy at The Joy of Tech™

Plausible Deniability, End of

Superbly scrivened ArsTechnica post, detailing the latest on the so-called Stuxnet fess-up. Can these people (the United States of America's Executive Branch) be any more naive. Poor grammar, nonetheless, yet a valid rhetorical interrogatory.

"This is the end of plausible deniability on Stuxnet," said Chris Bronk, a former State Department official, who is now a research fellow at Rice University. "Cyber is a dangerous place to play. This makes me very nervous that we don’t understand the entire set of consequences of releasing malware into the wild." - via Cyrus Farivar at ArsTechnica

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Doghouse Diaries: Pinnacle

Diagrammatical Observation, Network Topology

Superb data visualization effort, via FlowingData, of network topology studies. Today's MustRead.

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Nitrozac and Snaggy: Internet Entrepreneur

via the comic genius of Nitrozac and Snaggy at The Joy of Tech™

Microprocessors Found To Possess Backdoors...

Unsurprising news, via Sergei Skorobogatov Ph.D., currently in the post-doctorate program within the Security Group at the Computer Laboratory of the University of Cambridge, has apparently discovered incontrovertible proof of programmed back-doors in microprocessors manufactured in off-shore fabs.

"Claims were made by the intelligence agencies around the world, from MI5, NSA and IARPA, that silicon chips could be infected. We developed breakthrough silicon chip scanning technology to investigate these claims. We chose an American military chip that is highly secure with sophisticated encryption standard, manufactured in China. Our aim was to perform advanced code breaking and to see if there were any unexpected features on the chip. We scanned the silicon chip in an affordable time and found a previously unknown backdoor inserted by the manufacturer. This backdoor has a key, which we were able to extract. If you use this key you can disable the chip or reprogram it at will, even if locked by the user with their own key. This particular chip is prevalent in many systems from weapons, nuclear power plants to public transport. In other words, this backdoor access could be turned into an advanced Stuxnet weapon to attack potentially millions of systems. The scale and range of possible attacks has huge implications for National Security and public infrastructure..." via Sergei Skorobogatov Ph.D., Security Group, within the Computer Laboratory at the University of Cambridge

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Zuckerberg's IPO

National Security Agency Academics Front and Center

 

News, via HelpNet Security, detailing cybersecurity academic activities by our National Security Agency.  The Agency's newly funded National Centers of Academic Excellence in Cyber Operations Program to ultimately yield a larger pool of professionals with expertise in this area.

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