News, via Dan Goodin, writing at our beloved ArsTechnica, detailing an enormous factorization flaw within Infeneon-based 2048-bit RSA keys tied to a widening number of encryption products worldwide. The implications are equally enormous. H/T
'The researchers who uncovered the Infineon library flaw questioned whether the secrecy required by some of the certification process played a role. They wrote: Our work highlights the dangers of keeping the design secret and the implementation closed-source, even if both are thoroughly analyzed and certified by experts. The lack of public information causes a delay in the discovery of flaws (and hinders the process of checking for them), thereby increasing the number of already deployed and affected devices at the time of detection.' - via Dan Goodin at ArsTechnica
'In a key reinstallation attack, the adversary tricks a victim into reinstalling an already-in-use key. This is achieved by manipulating and replaying cryptographic handshake messages. When the victim reinstalls the key, associated parameters such as the incremental transmit packet number (i.e. nonce) and receive packet number (i.e. replay counter) are reset to their initial value. Essentially, to guarantee security, a key should only be installed and used once. Unfortunately, we found this is not guaranteed by the WPA2 protocol. By manipulating cryptographic handshakes, we can abuse this weakness in practice.' - via Mathy Vanhoef, Ph.D. and Frank Piessens, Ph.D.