Infosecurity.US

Information Security & Occasional Forays Into Adjacent Realms

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Sunday Security Maxim

February 07, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Hellrung’s Law: If you wait long enough, it will go away. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

February 07, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

February 06, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

First Law of Revision: Information necessitating a change of design will be conveyed to the designers after—and only after—the plans are complete. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

February 06, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

January 31, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

General “laws” that also apply to security. Fudd’s First Law of Opposition: If you push on something hard enough, it will fall over. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 31, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim
Time for lunch? Maybe a nap? Geez, I bored...

Time for lunch? Maybe a nap? Geez, I bored...

Saturday Security Maxim

January 30, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Mahbubani’s Maxim: Organizations and security managers who cannot envision security failures, will not be able to avoid them. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 30, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

January 24, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

He Who’s Name Must Never Be Spoken Maxim: Security programs and professionals who don’t talk a lot about “the adversary” or the “bad guys” aren’t prepared for them and don’t have good security. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 24, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

January 23, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Wolfe’s Maxim: If you don’t find it often, you often don’t find it. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 23, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

January 17, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Any Donuts Left? Maxim: But paying attention is very difficult. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 17, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

January 16, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Caffeine Maxim: On a day-to-day basis, security is mostly about paying attention. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 16, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

January 10, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Cyborg Maxim: Organizations and managers who automatically think “cyber” or “computer” when somebody says “security”, don’t have good security (including good cyber or computer security). Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 10, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

January 09, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

By the Book Maxim: Full compliance with security rules and regulations is not compatible with optimal security. Comment: Because security rules & regulations are typically dumb and unrealistic (at least partially). Moreover, they often lead to over-confidence, waste time and resources, create unhelpful distractions, engender cynicism about security, and encourage employees to find workarounds to get their job done— thus making security an “us vs. them” game. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 09, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

January 03, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Kafka’s Maxim: The people who write security rules and regulations don’t understand (1) what they are doing, or (2) how their policies drive actual security behaviors and misbehaviors. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 03, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

January 02, 2016 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Patton’s Maxim: When everybody is thinking alike about security, then nobody is thinking. Comment: Adapted from a broader maxim by General George S. Patton (1885-1945). Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

January 02, 2016 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

December 27, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Nietzsche’s Maxim: It’s not winning if the good guys have to adopt the unenlightened, illegal, or morally reprehensible tactics of the bad guys. Comment: "Whoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster.” - Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), Beyond Good and Evil. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

December 27, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

December 26, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

It’s Too Quiet Maxim: “Bad guys attack, and good guys react” is not a viable security strategy. Comment: It is necessary to be both proactive in defense, and to preemptively undermine the bad guys in offense. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

December 26, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

December 20, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

D(OU)BT Maxim: If you think Design Basis Threat (DBT) is something to test your security against, then you don’t understand DBT and you don’t understand your security application. Comment: If done properly—which it often is not—DBT is for purposes of allocating security resources based on probabilistic analyses, not judging security effectiveness. Moreover, if the threat probabilities in the DBT analysis are all essentially 1, the analysis is deeply flawed. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

December 20, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim
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Saturday Security Maxim

December 19, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Gunslingers’ Maxim: Any government security program will mistakenly focus more on dealing with force-on-force attacks than on attacks involving insider threats and more subtle, surreptitious attacks. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

December 19, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

December 13, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Tucker's Maxim #3 (Failure = Success Maxim): If you're not failing when you're training or testing your security, you're not learning anything. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

December 13, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

December 12, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Tucker's Maxim #2 (Toss the Dice Maxim): When the bullets start flying, it's a crapshoot and nobody can be sure how it'll turn out. Comment: So don't let it get to that point. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, *Argonne National Laboratory*.

December 12, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Sunday Security Maxim

December 06, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Tucker's Maxim #1 (Early Bird & Worm Maxim): An adversary is most vulnerable to detection and disruption just prior to an attack. Comment: So seize the initiative in the adversary's planning stages (from Craig Tucker). Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

December 06, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim

Saturday Security Maxim

December 05, 2015 by Marc Handelman in Security Maxim

Rig the Rig Maxim: Any supposedly “realistic” test of security is rigged. Compiled by Roger G. Johnston, Ph.D., CPP, Argonne National Laboratory.

December 05, 2015 /Marc Handelman
Security Maxim
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