**Mark H. Kim**, a contributing writer at **Quanta Magazine** **illuminates** a recent **paper** published at the IACR, and contributed by **Daniel J. Bernstein**, **Nadia Heninger**, **Paul Lou** and **Luke Valenta**, postulate in their paper '**Post-quantum RSA**' that in fact, the RSA algorithm might very well not be broken by the use of a quantum computational devices when aprpriately manipulated.

'The authors of the paper estimate that attacking a terabyte-size key using Shor’s algorithm would require around 2100 operations on a quantum computer, an enormous number comparable to the total number of bacterial cells on Earth.' - via **Mark H. Kim**, writing at **Quanta Magazine**, and from his article '**Why Quantum Computers Might Not Break Cryptography**

*The paper's content abstract:*

'Abstract. This paper proposes RSA parameters for which (1) key gen- eration, encryption, decryption, signing, and verification are feasible on today’s computers while (2) all known attacks are infeasible, even as- suming highly scalable quantum computers. As part of the performance analysis, this paper introduces a new algorithm to generate a batch of primes. As part of the attack analysis, this paper introduces a new quan- tum factorization algorithm that is often much faster than Shor’s algo- rithm and much faster than pre-quantum factorization algorithms. Initial pqRSA implementation results are provided.' Excerpt from **Post-quantum RSA** published via the **IACR**, and authored by **Daniel J. Bernstein**, **Nadia Heninger**, **Paul Lou** and **Luke Valenta**.