via the inimitable Dan Goodin, Security Editor at Ars Technica, comes this troubling blog post detailing the deep flaws in Bluetooth radio communications. Monikered KNOB (Key Negotiation of Bluetooth), the flaw permits interception of data in transit due to forced utilization of weak encryption. Today's MustRead!
"KNOB doesn't require an attacker to have any previously shared secret material or to observe the pairing process of the targeted devices. The exploit is invisible to Bluetooth apps and the operating systems they run on, making the attack almost impossible to detect without highly specialized equipment." - via Dan Goodin, Security Editor at Ars Technica
News, via the astonishingly prolific security writer Dan Goodin, editing, and reporting at Ars Technica, tells the tale of oil and gas network attacks in the United States, by a group monikered Xenotime. Think we're protected? Think again. Read the Dragos security researcher's post for truly concerning national security relevance.
"The group, now dubbed Xenotime by Dragos, quickly gained international attention in 2017 when researchers from Dragos and the Mandiant division of security firm FireEye independently reported Xenotime had recently triggered a dangerous operational outage at a critical-infrastructure site in the Middle East." via Dan Goodin, Security Editor reporting at Ars Technica
"Ultimately, XENOTIME’s expansion to an additional ICS vertical is deeply concerning given this entity’s willingness to undermine fundamental process safety in ICS environments placing lives and environments at great risk. - via Dragos
Opinion piece of merit, via James Stavridis, ADM USN (RET) and former Supreme Commander of NATO; in which, the good Admiral details behaviors, focus and actions of the PRC's People's Liberation Army Navy in relation to the world's undersea communications systems. An eye opener of immense potential downside. Today's Must Read.
"Once the researchers gain root access, they can bypass the router's most fundamental security protection. Known as the Trust Anchor, this Cisco security feature has been implemented in almost all of the company’s enterprise devices since 2013. The fact that the researchers have demonstrated a way to bypass it in one device indicates that it may be possible, with device-specific modifications, to defeat the Trust Anchor on hundreds of millions of Cisco units around the world." - via Lily Hay Newman, reporting for Wired Magazine
Andrea Peterson, writing for Ars Technica and the Project on Government Oversight, tells the tale of FCC malfeasance coming to the fore - in not mandating requisite technical remediation of SS7 shortcomings. Today's Must Read.
'A panel advising President Bill Clinton raised the alarm back in 1997, saying that SS7 was among America’s networking “crown jewels” and warning that if those crown jewels were “attacked or exploited, [it] could result in a situation that threatened the security and reliability of the telecommunications infrastructure.” By 2001, security researchers argued that risks associated with SS7 were multiplying thanks to “deregulation” and “the Internet and wireless networks.” They were proved right in 2008 when other researchers demonstrated ways that hackers could use flaws in SS7 to pinpoint the location of unsuspecting cell phone users.' - via Andrea Peterson, writing for both Ars Technica and Project on Government Oversight, tells the sorry tale of SS7
If not, you'd be well advised to get with the Program as it is time to Get Squared Away. You can test your domain here at DNS Flag Day, or educate those always hungry neurons here. All of this fal-de-rol is slated to be accomplished worldwide on or about 2019/02/01.
"The current DNS is unnecessarily slow and inefficient because of efforts to accommodate a few DNS systems that are not in compliance with DNS standards established two decades ago. To ensure further sustainability of the system it is time to end these accommodations and remediate the non-compliant systems. This change will make most DNS operations slightly more efficient, and also allow operators to deploy new functionality, including new mechanisms to protect against DDoS attacks." - via DNS Flag Day
via Muks Hirani, Sarah Jones and Ben Read writing at FireEye's threat research blog, comes notification of world-wide-dns-at-scale hijacks. Pre-election first-pass, stakes-in-the-ground reconnaisance foundation building? Or simple larcency? You be the judge. H/T
"FireEye Intelligence identified access from Iranian IPs to machines used to intercept, record and forward network traffic. While geolocation of an IP address is a weak indicator, these IP addresses were previously observed during the response to an intrusion attributed to Iranian cyber espionage actors." - via Muks Hirani, Sarah Jones and Ben Read writing at FireEye's threat research blog