
Meanwhile, in flawed intelligence analysis news (now promoted by elected officials) the latest 'Iranian State Sponsored Financial Institution Attacks' attribution statements lack both clarity and firm evidential artifacts. Kudos to InformationWeek's' Mathew J. Schwartz for making the appalling flaws clear.
Notwithstanding the reported lack of evidence, the reality of the overt linkage between and betwixt the Iranian national defense infrastructure (e.g., the IRIA, Gendarmerie, IRGC, Oghab 2, Quds Force, and the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution, etc.) and external-to-the-government hacker collectives is is just that - overt, rather than covert.
The smoking gun, as it were, will likely target those Iranian nationals [rather than the theocratic State]; but again, predicated on conjecture, rather than evidentiary proof.
Whilst a multitude of electronic acts of warfare can be sourced to the Islamic Republic of Iran or the nations-states' thralls, the current activities cannot yet be attributed with finality of judgment. The key concept here is evidence leading to a reasoned and prudent understanding of attribution within the scope of information security and electronic warfare realms, specifically focused on the attacks under scrutiny.
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